Stock Price Manipulation Through Takeover Bids

Stock Price Manipulation Through Takeover Bids

Hedge Fund Activism vs. Hostile Takeover Bids⇤

We compare hedge fund activism and hostile tender offers in a unified framework where any investor who acquires an equity stake to improve firm value faces a dual free-rider problem: Neither do dispersed shareholders sell their shares unless the price fully reflects the anticipated value improvement nor do those who retain their shares participate in the costs. We show that activism and tender ...

Share Tendering Strategies and the Success of Hostile Takeover Bids

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Unchecked intermediaries: Price manipulation in an emerging stock market

How costly is the poor governance of market intermediaries? Using unique trade level data from the stock market in Pakistan, we find that when brokers trade on their own behalf, they earn annual rates of return that are 50-90 percentage points higher than those earned by outside investors. Neither market timing nor liquidity provision by brokers can explain this profitability differential. Inst...

Articulation Compatibility in Eliciting Price Bids

Do consumers prefer auctions that allow them to place more precise bids to auctions that accept less precise bids? Can consumers accurately estimate their need for price-elicitation precision? This research addresses these questions by applying the notion of compatibility to the relationship between consumers’ bidding price uncertainty and the precision implied by the price-elicitation task. Da...