Stock Option Plans for Executives
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
The Effectiveness of Stock Option Plans
Despite Stock Option Plans’ (SOPs) widespread use, evidence regarding their use and their effectiveness is relatively sparse and typically relies on an agency theory perspective that emphasizes the principal’s interests in a market context. This study focuses on the agent as an individual who is involved in SOP management. Eighteen interviews with senior executives were conducted. Their respons...
متن کاملCosts of Broad-Based Stock Option Plans∗
We generate estimates of the costs of broad-based stock option programs under varying assumptions about why firms use these pay schemes. We show that, if accounting considerations alone drive option grants, a typical firm in our sample incurs between 50 cents and one dollar of real costs in order to increase reported pre-tax net income by $1. This cost is reduced, but is still quite substantial...
متن کاملReload Employee Stock Option Plans: Incentive Alignment or Rent Extraction
Abstract: A reload option awards a new option for every share tendered to exercise an existing option. We use a sample of 242 firms that adopted reload provisions to investigate claims that firms use reload options to encourage early exercise and increase share ownership (incentive alignment) against the competing claim that reloads transfer wealth from shareholders to managers. We find that CE...
متن کاملManagerial incentives and executive stock option repricing: A study of US casino executives
The practice of executive stock option repricing is examined using a sample of firms in the gaming industry during 1994-98. The practice of repricing executive stock options is often criticized, however this paper recognizes that there may be conditions when such recontracting may be viewed as beneficial to shareholders. Specifically, given that options provide both incentives to increase risk ...
متن کاملWhat Fraction of Stock Option Grants to Top Executives Have Been Backdated or Manipulated?
W estimate that 13.6% of all option grants to top executives during the period 1996–2005 were backdated or otherwise manipulated. Our study primarily focuses on grants that were unscheduled and at-themoney, of which we estimate that 18.9% were manipulated. The fraction is 23.0% before the new two-day filing requirement took effect on August 29, 2002, and 10.0% afterward. For the minority of gra...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: California Law Review
سال: 1953
ISSN: 0008-1221
DOI: 10.2307/3477985