STATISTICAL CRITERIA FOR SEQUENTIAL INSPECTOR-LEADERSHIP GAMES
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Statistical Criteria for Sequential Inspector-leadership Games
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of the Operations Research Society of Japan
سال: 1992
ISSN: 0453-4514,2188-8299
DOI: 10.15807/jorsj.35.134