منابع مشابه
Sustaining Cooperation in Trust Games
It is well-known in evolutionary game theory that population clustering in Prisoner’s Dilemma games allows some cooperative strategies to invade populations of stable defecting strategies. We adapt this idea of population clustering to a two-person trust game. Without knowing it, players are typed based on their recent track record as to whether or not they are trusting (Players 1) and whether ...
متن کاملSustaining Cooperation in Heterogeneous Groups
The public goods game has been studied extensively in the lab as the quintessential model of a social dilemma. Several mechanisms have been demonstrated to promote group cooperation in linear voluntary contribution experiments – such as communication, costly punishment, and centralized bonuses and fines. However, lab experiments have largely neglected a central obstacle to e cient public good p...
متن کاملSustaining Cooperation: Community Enforcement vs. Specialized Enforcement∗
We introduce the possibility of direct punishment by specialized enforcers into a model of community enforcement. Specialized enforcers need to be given incentives to carry out costly punishments. Our main result shows that, when the specialized enforcement technology is suffi ciently effective, cooperation is best sustained by a “one-time enforcer punishment equilibrium,” where any deviation b...
متن کاملWorking Effectively in a Matrix: Building and Sustaining Cooperation
The complexities of today’s organizations have made it increasingly challenging for leaders to encourage and sustain a culture of cooperation. As organizations become flatter and leaner and people are required to do “more with less,” the key to success is the ability to coordinate decisions and actions across organizational boundaries and gain the support of people who often have competing prio...
متن کاملPunishment and Gossip: Sustaining Cooperation in a Public Goods Game
In an environment in which free-riders are better off than cooperators, social control is required to foster and maintain cooperation. There are two main paths through which social control can be applied: punishment and reputation. Our experiments explore the efficacy of punishment and reputation on cooperation rates, both in isolation and in combination. Using a Public Goods Game, we are inter...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Oxford Economic Papers
سال: 2012
ISSN: 0030-7653,1464-3812
DOI: 10.1093/oep/gps030