Soft Shareholder Activism

Soft Shareholder Activism

This paper studies voice and exit as mechanisms of shareholder activism when obtaining costly formal control is not feasible. Different from the existing literature, voice is interpreted as a strategic transmission of information from an activist investor to an opportunistic manager. The analysis provides several results. First, voice and exit exhibit complementarity, and hence, exit can be an ...

Shareholder Activism: A Multidisciplinary Review

‘Low-Cost’ Shareholder Activism: A Review of the Evidence

Entrepreneurial Shareholder Activism: Hedge Funds and Other Private Investors

We examine recent confrontational activism campaigns by hedge funds and other private investors. The main parallels between the groups are a significantly positive market reaction for the target firm around the initial Schedule 13D filing date, significantly positive returns over the subsequent year, and the activist’s high success rate in achieving its original objective. Further, both activis...

“Say on Pay” Shareholder Advisory Votes on Executive Compensation: The New Frontier of Corporate Governance Activism