SOCIAL CONTROL AND CORRUPTION OFFENCES OF LEGAL ENTITIES
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Legal Standards, Enforcement, and Corruption
Stricter laws require more incisive and costlier enforcement. Because enforcement activity depends both on available tax revenue and the honesty of officials, the optimal legal standard of a benevolent government is increasing in per capita income and decreasing in officials’ corruption. In contrast to the “tollbooth view” of regulation, the standard chosen by a self-interested government is a ...
متن کاملfaculty of psychology and social sciences group of anthropology master thesis in major of anthropology
چکیده پایان نامه (شامل خلاصه، اهداف، روش های اجرا و نتایج به دست آمده): کار جمع آوری گو یش های محلی در سال های اخیر شتاب امیدوار کننده ای به خود گرفته است. شاید از بارزترین اهداف جمع آوری گویش های مختلف، ثبت و ضبط آن، جلوگیری از نابودی و مهمتر از همه حل مشکلات دستوری زبان رسمی باشد. دقت در فرآیند های زبانی گویش های محلی نوع ارتباط مردم نواحی مختلف با پیرامون نشان را به ما نشان خواهد داد. از س...
Calculating Income Tax Evasion of Legal Entities and Examining its Sustainability through Threshold Non-linear Method
The purpose of this study is to calculate tax evasion based on the income of legal entities and to examine its stability, which has been done by estimating the Tanzi monetary demand function during 1370-1397. The demand function included the ratio of currency holdings to supply of money as a dependent variable and the tax variables of legal entities, the ratio of wages and salaries to national...
متن کاملDealing with Social and Legal Entities in the Obstetric and Neonatal Domain
This paper presents the Obstetric and Neonatal Ontology (OntONeo). This ontology has been created to provide a consensus representation of salient electronic health record (EHR) data and to serve interoperability of the associated data and information systems. More generally, it will serve interoperability of clinical and translational data, for example deriving from genomics disciplines and fr...
متن کاملSocial Structure and Cultures of Corruption
Corruption often creates a “briber’s dilemma”: each of the “clients” competing for a rent allocated by a government official has an incentive to pay bribes to try to obtain preferential treatment, but they would all be better off if they could mutually commit not to pay bribes. This paper uses a model of linked games to show how informal relationships among the clients may enable them to enforc...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Foreign Legislation and Comparative Law
سال: 2017
ISSN: 1991-3222
DOI: 10.12737/article_598063fa635249.09605022