Size Matters: Corruption Perceptions versus Corruption Experiences by Firms

Corruption and the Other(s): Scope of Superordinate Identity Matters for Corruption Permissibility.

The decision to engage in corruption-public and private corruption, nepotism, and embezzlement-is often attributed to rational actors maximizing benefits to themselves. However, the importance of reciprocal relationships in humans suggests that an actor may weigh the costs of harms of her corrupt behavior to individuals who may generate future benefits for her. We hypothesize that actors who ha...

Corruption

corruption, government size, and openness

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Why Do North African Firms Engage in Corruption?

This paper empirically analyzes the main microeconomic determinants of two forms of corruption supply, administrative corruption and state capture, by Maghrebi firms. This study is based on a new database of near 600 Algerian, Moroccan and Tunisian firms. I show that tax evasion is a major factor of the engagement of firms in administrative corruption. The latter increases with the share of sal...

Corruption and Firms: Evidence from Randomized Audits in Brazil

We exploit spatial variation in randomized anti-corruption audits related to government procurement contracts in Brazil to assess how corruption affects resource allocation, firm performance, and the local economy. After an anti-corruption crackdown, regions experience more entrepreneurship, improved access to finance, and higher levels of economic activity. This is inconsistent with corruption...