Simple mechanisms and preferences for honesty
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Simple mechanisms and preferences for honesty
We consider full implementation in abstract complete-information environments when agents have an arbitrarily small preference for honesty. We offer a condition called separable punishment and show that when it holds and there are at least two agents, any social choice function can be implemented by a simple mechanism in two rounds of iterated deletion of strictly dominated strategies. We also ...
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Article history: Received 24 November 2015 Available online 27 December 2016 JEL classification: C72 C78 C92 D03 D86
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Games and Economic Behavior
سال: 2014
ISSN: 0899-8256
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2013.11.011