منابع مشابه
Pursuit- Evasion Games
Two players, Red and Blue, each independently choose a vertex of a connected graph G. Red must then pay Blue an amount equal to the distance between the vertices chosen. In this note, w e investigate the value v(G) of this pursuit-evasion game for various classes of graphs G, as well as those optimal mixed strategies for achieving v(G). It is shown that some rather counterintuitive behavior can...
متن کاملApplied Mathematics and Optimization Linear-Quadratic Stochastic Pursuit-Evasion Games
A linear-quadratic differential game in which the system state is affected by disturbance and both players have access to different measurements is solved. The problem is first converted ,to an optimization problem in infinite-dimensional state space and then solved using standard techniques. For convenience, "L2-white noise" instead of "Wiener process" setup is used.
متن کاملModel Checking Knowledge in Pursuit Evasion Games
In a pursuit-evasion game, one or more pursuers aim to discover the existence of, and then capture, an evader. The paper studies pursuit-evasion games in which players may have incomplete information concerning the game state. A methodology is presented for the application of a model checker for the logic of knowledge and time to verify epistemic properties in such games. Experimental results a...
متن کاملVisibility Induction for Discretized Pursuit-Evasion Games
We study a two-player pursuit-evasion game, in which an agent moving amongst obstacles is to be maintained within “sight” of a pursuing robot. Using a discretization of the environment, our main contribution is to design an efficient algorithm that decides, given initial positions of both pursuer and evader, if the evader can take any moving strategy to go out of sight of the pursuer at any tim...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Computers & Mathematics with Applications
سال: 1987
ISSN: 0898-1221
DOI: 10.1016/0898-1221(87)90095-2