Share-option based compensation expense, shareholder returns and financial crisis
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Contemporary Accounting & Economics
سال: 2019
ISSN: 1815-5669
DOI: 10.1016/j.jcae.2018.11.001