Shadow economies at times of banking crises: Empirics and theory
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
A Theory of Banking Crises
In order to protect the public's confidence in deposit money, governments usually guarantee bank deposits implicitly or through an explicit deposit insurance system. Thus bank insolvency does not induce immediate bank runs. In many episodes of banking crises, several years passed quietly after bank insolvency had occurred, with the insolvency continuing to develop under the surface, and the ras...
متن کاملBanking and Shadow Banking
Tightening financial regulation squeezes banking activities into the shadow banking sector, which may hurt financial stability and production (Plantin, 2014). Unlike Plantin’s work, we investigate regulations that reduce banks’ leverage and dampen financial amplification effects. Moreover, our paper studies the trade-off between economic growth and financial stability in light of shadow banking...
متن کاملLegal aspects of Shadow Banking
Shadow Banking system, as an investment method, while being an integral part of the supervised banking system, is a rival for banks and governance institutions in financing and oversight. As a result, its development has created a situation for regulated institutions, which leads to concerns about the legal and regulatory responsibilities of the banking and financial system for investment not g...
متن کاملCentral Banking , Free Banking , and Financial Crises
Agrowing literature explores the concept of free banking on both a theoretical and an historical basis. George Selgin (1988) sets out the theory of free banking and makes a compelling case that, despite the uniqueness of money, the forces of supply and demand are more conducive to monetary stability, correctly understood, than are the edicts of a central bank. Larry White (1984), focusing on th...
متن کاملLeverage, Securitization and Shadow Banking: Theory and Policy
Leverage and securitization are at the core of the shadow banking system. We provide a non-technical review of the theory of leverage developed in collateral general equilibrium models with incomplete markets. We explain how leverage can be endogenously determined in equilibrium, and its relation with tail risk, volatility and asset prices. We provide a description of the Leverage Cycle and how...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Banking & Finance
سال: 2016
ISSN: 0378-4266
DOI: 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2014.09.017