Sequential Auctions with Capacity Constraints: An Experimental Investigation
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
An Experimental Study of Information Revelation Policies in Sequential Auctions
Theoretical models of information asymmetry have identified a tradeoff between the desire to learn and the desire to prevent an opponent from learning private information. This paper reports a laboratory experiment that investigates if actual bidders account for this tradeoff, using a sequential procurement auction with private cost information and varying information revelation policies. Speci...
متن کاملAn Experimental Investigation of Auctions and Bargaining in Procurement
The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-pro t purposes provided that: • a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source • a link is made to the metadata record in DRO • the full-text is not changed in any way The full-text must not be...
متن کاملInformation Sharing in Common Value Auctions An Experimental Investigation
A number of conflicting conjectures have been proposed about the role of information and collusion in common-value auctions. This study investigates these hypotheses in an experimental setting by conducting a series of auctions with an equal number of signals (estimates of the object’s value) but a varying number of bidders among whom those signals are concentrated. Specifically, two types of c...
متن کاملOligopoly with Capacity Constraints and Thresholds
Abstract Extended Oligopoly models will be introduced and examined in which the firms might face capacity limits, thresholds for minimal and maximal moves, and antitrust thresholds in the case of partial cooperation. Similar situation occurs when there is an additional cost of output adjustment, which is discontinuous at zero due to set-up costs. In these cases the payoff functions of the...
متن کاملDesigning Bidding Strategies in Sequential Auctions for Risk Averse Agents: A Theoretical and Experimental Investigation
Designing efficient bidding strategies for sequential auctions remains an important, open problem area in agent-mediated electronic markets. In existing literature, a variety of bidding strategies have been proposed and have been shown to perform with increasing degrees of efficiency. However, most of strategies proposed so far do not explicitly model bidders’ attitudes towards risk which, in m...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Games
سال: 2018
ISSN: 2073-4336
DOI: 10.3390/g9010015