Sequential auctions, price trends, and risk preferences
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Sequential auctions, price trends, and risk preferences
We analyze sequential auctions where bidders are heterogeneous in risk exposures and exhibit non-quasilinear utilities. We derive an increasing pure strategy equilibrium for the sequential Dutch and Vickrey auctions respectively, with an arbitrary number of identical objects for sale. A suffi cient, and to certain extent necessary, condition for this result is that bidders’marginal utilities ar...
متن کاملDejan Trifunović * SEQUENTIAL AUCTIONS AND PRICE ANOMALIES
* University of Belgrade, Faculty of Economics, [email protected] JEL CLASSIFICATION: D44 ABSTRACT: In sequential auctions objects are sold one by one in separate auctions. These sequential auctions might be organised as sequential first-price, second-price, or English auctions. We will derive equilibrium bidding strategies for these auctions. Theoretical models suggest that prices in sequent...
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In this paper I develop a Prospect theory based model to explain bidding in first-price auctions. As suggested in the literature, bidding occurs in these auctions in an inherently ambiguous environment due to lack of information about bidders’ risk attitudes and bidding strategies. I show that bidding in first-price auctions can be rationalized as a combination of reactions to underlying ambigu...
متن کاملSequential vs. single-round uniform-price auctions
The opinions expressed in this paper do not necessarily reflect the position of Summary We study sequential and single-round uniform-price auctions with affiliated values. We derive symmetric equilibrium for the auction in which k1 objects are sold in the first round and k2 in the second round, with and without revelation of the first-round winning bids. We demonstrate that auctioning objects i...
متن کاملAuction Size and Price Dynamics in Sequential Auctions
This paper uses a unique data-set collected in a consistent way over a number of different auctions to investigate how empirical regularities in sequential auctions depend on the number of lots sold in those auctions. It is shown that prices tend to decline faster in auctions in which a small number of lots were sold. Starting prices tend to be higher in auctions with fewer lots, while average ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Economic Theory
سال: 2015
ISSN: 0022-0531
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2015.05.006