Semantic inferentialism as (a Form of) active externalism
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Epistemology and Active Externalism
Recently, there has been a growing interest in topics at the intersection of epistemology and externalist philosophy of mind in the form of active externalism. Active externalism, contrary to Putnam and Burge’s content (or passive) externalism, concerns the aspects of the environment that determine the content and the flow of cognition, not by acting as the background which cognition takes plac...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences
سال: 2016
ISSN: 1568-7759,1572-8676
DOI: 10.1007/s11097-016-9458-y