Selection of a correlated equilibrium in Markov stopping games
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Selection of a correlated equilibrium in Markov stopping games
This paper deals with an extension of the concept of correlated strategies to Markov stopping games. The Nash equilibrium approach to solving nonzero-sum stopping games may give multiple solutions. An arbitrator can suggest to each player the decision to be applied at each stage based on a joint distribution over the players’ decisions according to some optimality criterion. This is a form of e...
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We study nonzero-sum stopping games with randomized stopping strategies. The existence of Nash equilibrium and ε-equilibrium strategies are discussed under various assumptions on players random payoffs and utility functions dependent on the observed discrete time Markov process. Then we will present a model of a market game in which randomized stopping times are involved. The model is a mixture...
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We prove that every undiscounted multi-player stopping game in discrete time admits an approximate correlated equilibrium. Moreover, the equilibrium has three appealing properties: trembling-hand perfectness players do not use non-credible threats; normal-form correlation communication is required only before the game starts; uniformness it is an approximate equilibrium in any long enough niteh...
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In many situations, such as trade in stock exchanges, agents have many instances to act even though the interaction lasts a relatively short time. The agents in such situations can often coordinate their actions in advance, but coordination during the game consumes too much time. An equilibrium in such situations has to be sequential in order to handle mistakes made by players. In this paper, w...
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A quitting game is a sequential game where each player has two actions: to continue or to quit. The game continues as long as all players decide to continue. The moment at least one player decides to quit, the game terminates. The terminal payoff depends on the subset of players who quit at the terminating stage. If the game continues forever, then the payoff for the players is some fixed-payof...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: European Journal of Operational Research
سال: 2008
ISSN: 0377-2217
DOI: 10.1016/j.ejor.2006.10.050