منابع مشابه
Selecting Cheap-talk Equilibria Selecting Cheap-talk Equilibria
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متن کاملSelecting Cheap-Talk Equilibria∗
There are typically multiple equilibrium outcomes in the Crawford-Sobel (CS) model of strategic information transmission. This paper identifies a simple condition on equilibrium payoffs, called NITS, that selects among CS equilibria. Under a commonly used regularity condition, only the equilibrium with the maximal number of induced actions satisfies NITS. We discuss various justifications for N...
متن کاملSelecting Cheap - Talk
The copyright to this Article is held by the Econometric Society. It may be downloaded, printed and reproduced only for educational or research purposes, including use in course packs. No downloading or copying may be done for any commercial purpose without the explicit permission of the Econometric Society. For such commercial purposes contact the Office of the Econometric Society (contact inf...
متن کاملRefining Cheap - Talk Equilibria *
Several conceptual points are made concerning communication in games of asymmetric information. Equilibrium refinements of Sender-Receiver cheap-talk games that are based on the concept of a putative equilibrium, and which rely on the presence of a rich language with literal meanings, are discussed. Three nested criteria are proposed: strong announcement-proofness, announcement-proofness, and w...
متن کاملDurable Cheap Talk Equilibria∗
We consider a cheap-talk game with one sender and one receiver. If the receiver does not commit to listen to only one message, the equilibrium refinements due to Farrell [5], Grossman and Perry [7] and Matthews, OkunoFujiwara and Postlewaite [11] are no longer applicable. We discuss different notions of durability and sequential credibility when a message can later be followed by more messages,...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Econometrica
سال: 2008
ISSN: 0012-9682,1468-0262
DOI: 10.1111/j.0012-9682.2008.00819.x