Secret information acquisition in Cournot markets
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Information Acquisition in Financial Markets: a Correction∗
This note provides a proper example for the channel of strategic complementarities we proposed in our 2000 paper "Information Acquisition in Financial Markets". As pointed out in Chamley (2007), our earlier example contained an error, which, once corrected, reveals that our example actually exhibits strategic substitutability in information acquisition. JEL Codes: G14, D82, D84 In our 2000 pape...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Economic Theory
سال: 2001
ISSN: 0938-2259
DOI: 10.1007/pl00004205