Root-of-Trust Abstractions for Symbolic Analysis: Application to Attestation Protocols

A key component in building trusted computing services is a highly secure anchor that serves as Root-of-Trust (RoT). There are several works conduct formal analysis on the security of such commodity RoTs (or parts it), and also few ones devoted to verifying service whole. However, most existing schemes try verify without differentiating internal cryptography mechanisms underlying hardware token from client application cryptography. This approach limits, some extent, reasoning can be made about level assurance overall system by automated tools. In this work, we present methodology enables use verification tools towards complex protocols using computing. The focus security, provided integration RoT services, how these translate larger systems when cryptographic engine considered perfectly secure. Using Tamarin prover, demonstrate feasibility our instantiating it for TPM-based remote attestation service, which one core needed today’s increased attack landscape.