Revealed distributional preferences: Individuals vs. teams
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Revealed distributional preferences: Individuals vs. teams☆☆☆
We compare experimentally the revealed distributional preferences of individuals and teams in allocation tasks. We find that teams are significantly more benevolent than individuals in the domain of disadvantageous inequality while the benevolence in the domain of advantageous inequality is similar across decision makers. A consequence for the frequency of preference types is that while a subst...
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We weaken the implicit assumption of rational choice theory that imposes that preferences do not depend on the choice set. We concentrate on the cases where the preferences change monotonically when the choice set expands. We show that rationalizability is then equivalent to state the usual strong axiom of revealed preferences to the binary relation of "revealed reversals of preferences".
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
سال: 2014
ISSN: 0167-2681
DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2013.12.012