Reputation Deals: A Theory of Endogenous Teams
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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Agents work for their own reputations when young but for their rmswhen old. An individual with an established reputation cannot credibly commit to exerting e¤ort when working alone. However, by hiring and working with juniors of uncertain reputation, seniors will have incentives to exert e¤ort. Incentives for young agents arise from a concern for their own reputation (and the opportunity to t...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2001
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.881827