منابع مشابه
Incentives and Information Asymmetry of Managerial Talent in Executive Compensation
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Managerial talent is neither observable nor divisible. Thus, performance measures that evaluate a manager’s human capital are significant not only for compensating a manager through accurate appraisal, but also for inferring managerial talent. In practice, however, talent measures are often imperfect, thereby hindering firms from control of a manager’s behaviors. As such, exploring the nature o...
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The petroleum industry of Iran, due to its special contribution to GDP and for its optimal performance, needs talented people in the leadership and managial roles for the future of petroleum industry. So, the main purpose of this research was to design an effective model for identifying the talent pool of Managers and determinants of managerial talent potentials among petroleum industry staff. ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Bulletin of the Moscow State Regional University
سال: 2020
ISSN: 2224-0209
DOI: 10.18384/2224-0209-2020-3-1032