Relative performance evaluation, agent hold-up and firm organization
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of the Japanese and International Economies
سال: 2008
ISSN: 0889-1583
DOI: 10.1016/j.jjie.2007.07.004