Relational Political Contribution under Common Agency

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چکیده

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Relational Political Contribution under Common Agency∗

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ژورنال

عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Public Economic Theory

سال: 2016

ISSN: 1097-3923

DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12215