Rationality and Beliefs in Dynamic Games: Revealed-Preference Foundations

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چکیده

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ژورنال

عنوان ژورنال: Electronic Proceedings in Theoretical Computer Science

سال: 2016

ISSN: 2075-2180

DOI: 10.4204/eptcs.215.3