Rationality and Beliefs in Dynamic Games: Revealed-Preference Foundations
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Revealed preference, iterated belief revision and dynamic games
In previous work (G. Bonanno, Rational choice and AGM belief revision, Artificial Intelligence, 2009) a semantics for AGM belief revision was proposed based on choice frames, borrowed from the rational choice literature. In this paper we discuss how to use choice frames to analyze extensive-form games. Given an extensive form with perfect recall, a choice frame can be used to represent a player...
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The analysis of dynamic games hinges on assumptions about players’ actions and beliefs at information sets that are not actually reached during game play, and that players themselves do not expect to reach. However, it is not obvious how to elicit intended actions and conditional beliefs at such information sets. Hence, key concepts such as sequential rationality, backward induction, and forwar...
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In this dissertation, we explore two particular themes in connection with the study of games and general economic interactions: bounded resources and rationality. The rapidly maturing field of algorithmic game theory concerns itself with looking at the computational limits and effects when agents in such an interaction make choices in their “self-interest.” The solution concepts that have been ...
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A strong feeling, directly excited by an object, is felt (except when contradicted by the feelings of other people) as its own sufficient justification – no more requiring the support of a reason than the fact that ginger is hot in the mouth; and it almost requires a philosopher to recognize the need of a reason for his feelings, unless he has been under the practical necessity of justifying th...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Electronic Proceedings in Theoretical Computer Science
سال: 2016
ISSN: 2075-2180
DOI: 10.4204/eptcs.215.3