Pseudo-visibility: A Game Mechanic Involving Willful Ignorance

Willful Ignorance in a World of Biased Misinformation

Suppose individuals face a claim of uncertain validity and can only obtain more information from sources known to sometimes report biased misinformation for or against the claim. In such an environment, it is optimal for Bayesian expected utility maximizers to select the source biased toward their current behavior even if they know that source more frequently reports misinformation than an oppo...

Does Willful Ignorance Deflect Punishment? – An Experimental Study

This paper studies whether people can avoid punishment by remaining willfully ignorant about possible negative consequences of their actions for others. We employ a laboratory experiment, using modified dictator games in which a dictator can remain willfully ignorant about the payoff consequences of his decision for a receiver. A third party can punish the dictator after observing the dictator’...

Automatic Game Design via Mechanic Generation

Game designs often center on the game mechanics— rules governing the logical evolution of the game. We seek to develop an intelligent system that generates computer games. As first steps towards this goal we present a composable and cross-domain representation for game mechanics that draws from AI planning action representations. We use a constraint solver to generate mechanics subject to desig...

A Role-Switching Mechanic for Reflective Decision-Making Game

This paper introduces issues about a methodology for the design of serious games that help players/learners understand their decisionmaking process. First, we discuss the development of a video game system based on a role-switching mechanic where the player becomes the game leader of the experience. Then, we introduce game mechanics designed to induce a specific behavior, overconfidence, that h...

1 Equal Culpability and the Scope of the Willful Ignorance Doctrine