Proportionally Representative Participatory Budgeting with Ordinal Preferences

Proportionally Representative Participatory Budgeting: Axioms and Algorithms

Participatory budgeting is one of the exciting developments in deliberative grassroots democracy. We concentrate on approval elections and propose proportional representation axioms in participatory budgeting, by generalizing relevant axioms for approval-based multi-winner elections. We observe a rich landscape with respect to the computational complexity of identifying proportional budgets and...

Preference Elicitation For Participatory Budgeting

Participatory budgeting enables the allocation of public funds by collecting and aggregating individual preferences; it has already had a sizable real-world impact. But making the most of this new paradigm requires a rethinking of some of the basics of computational social choice, including the very way in which individuals express their preferences. We analytically compare four preference elic...

Participatory Budgeting: An Evidence Review

Matching with Dynamic Ordinal Preferences

We consider the problem of repeatedly matching a set of alternatives to a set of agents with dynamic ordinal preferences. Despite a recent focus on designing one-shot matching mechanisms in the absence of monetary transfers, little study has been done on strategic behavior of agents in sequential assignment problems. We formulate a generic dynamic matching problem via a sequential stochastic ma...

Emotional Arousal Effects in Participatory Budgeting Decisions

Participatory budgeting is applied by an increasing number of municipalities and organizations. Citizens can decide over an institutional budget. The allocation mechanism can affect emotional arousal, which influences the choice evaluation in the decicion-making process. Building on the endowment effect, we conduct an experiment testing a novel participatory budgeting approach that includes an ...