منابع مشابه
Proportional Payoffs in Majority Games
This paper extends the Baron-Ferejohn model of legislative bargaining to general weighted majority games with two modifications: first, payoff division can only be agreed upon after the coalition has formed (two-stage bargaining); second, negotiations in the coalition can break down, in which case a new coalition may be formed (reversible coalitions). Under the most natural bargaining protocol,...
متن کاملDemand bargaining and proportional payoffs in majority games
We study a majoritarian bargaining model in which players make payoff demands in decreasing order of voting weight. The unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome is such that the minimal winning coalition of the players that move first forms with payoffs proportional to the voting weights. This result advances previous analysis in terms of one or more of the following: a) the simplicity of the...
متن کاملCeDEx Discussion Paper No. 2008–03 Proportional Payoffs in Majority Games
This paper extends the Baron-Ferejohn model of legislative bargaining to general weighted majority games with two modifications: first, payoff division can only be agreed upon after the coalition has formed (two-stage bargaining); second, negotiations in the coalition can break down, in which case a new coalition may be formed (reversible coalitions). Under the most natural bargaining protocol,...
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We study the structure of the set of equilibrium payoffs in finite games, both for Nash equilibrium and correlated equilibrium. A nonempty subset of R is shown to be the set of Nash equilibrium payoffs of a bimatrix game if and only if it is a finite union of rectangles. Furthermore, we show that for any nonempty finite union of rectangles U and any polytope P ⊂ R containing U , there exists a ...
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Optimization under uncertainty is central to a number of fields, and it is by now well-known that one can learn to play a repeated game without a priori knowledge of the game, as long as one observes the payoffs (even if one does not see the opponent’s play). We consider the complementary scenario in which one does not observe the payoffs but does observe the opponent’s play. Curiously, we show...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2008
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1112626