Private Provision of Public Goods that are Complements for Private Goods: Application to Open Source Software Developments

Public Provision of Private Goods

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On the Private Provision of Public Goods

We consider a general model of the non-cooperative provision of a public good. Under very weak assumptions there will always exist a unique Nash equilibrium in our model. A small redistribution of wealth among the contributing consumers will not change the equilibrium amount of the public good. However, larger redistributions of wealth will change the set of contributors and thereby change the ...

Private provision of discrete public goods

We investigate the private provision of a discrete public good. When the size and decomposition of the group are certain, such a problem has, in general, multiple equilibria. Yet, if it is commonly believed that some individuals may be altruists and that the size of the group is a Poisson random variable then equilibrium is unique. If the decomposition uncertainty is very small and the expected...

Open Source Software: Free Provision of Complex Public Goods

Open source software, developed by volunteers, appears counter to the conventional wisdom that without ownership rights or government intervention, public goods will not be efficiently provided. But complexity makes a difference: contracts are incomplete and ownership rights do not necessarily elicit socially optimal effort. I consider three mechanisms that improve the provision of complex soft...

Public Supply of Private Goods