Premise Acceptability, Deontology, Internalism, Justification
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Weak Inferential Internalism
Inferential internalism holds that for one to be inferentially justified in believing P on the basis of E one must be justified in believing that E makes probable P. Inferential internalism has long been accused of generating a vicious regress on inferential justification that has drastic skeptical consequences. However, recently Hookway and Rhoda have defended a more modest form of internalism...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Informal Logic
سال: 1995
ISSN: 0824-2577,0824-2577
DOI: 10.22329/il.v17i2.2414