Political Accountability, Electoral Control and Media Bias
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Japanese Economic Review
سال: 2013
ISSN: 1352-4739
DOI: 10.1111/jere.12028