Polarized we trade? Intraparty polarization and US trade policy

Abstract Research indicates that polarization has led to an increasing dispersion between moderate and more extreme voters within both parties. Intraparty supposedly affects the nature of interparty competition as it creates political space for new realignments rise anti-establishment candidates. This article examines extent impact intraparty in Congress on US trade policy. Specifically, whether (and which) policy preferences are distributed parties, well how influenced outcome negotiations. It is theorized causes crosscutting legislative coalitions around specific policies ideological factions, with consequences By relying a unique dataset congressional letters co-sponsorship legislation, first derives from members computes their means. Two contemporary cases examined: The Transpacific Partnership Agreement US–Mexico–Canada Agreement. Via structured-focused comparison cases, paper finally assesses under which combinations preference-based ideology-based manages ratify agreements. Findings suggest parties intrinsically polarized free fair yet show variance degree polarization. These findings contribute existing work bipartisanship factions foreign realm, shows circumstances legislators can build policies.