Planned Obsolescence as an Incentive Device for Unobservable Quality
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Planned Obsolescence and the Provision of Unobservable Quality
This paper develops the idea that obsolescence acts as an incentive device to provide quality for experience goods. The argument is that obsolescence affects the frequency at which consumers repurchase products and may punish producers for a lack of quality. A higher rate of obsolescence enables a firm to convince its consumers that it provides high quality. We identify a trade–off between qual...
متن کاملCommunication about Planned Obsolescence as an Atypical Two-sided Message
While many information technology vendors deliberately cut their products’ lifecycles to elicit repeat purchases, consumers are often unaware of such planned obsolescence. This paper investigates the effects of atypical two-sided communication about planned obsolescence on consumers’ beliefs and buying intentions. Drawing upon insights from inoculation theory, we hypothesize that trust and inte...
متن کاملCompetitive planned obsolescence
The incentives that durability offers to a monopolist to price discriminate over time and the related difficulties that secondhand markets create in these situations have been well recognized in the economics literature. The conventional problem for the monopolist is that, having sold a durable good, there is an incentive to reduce price later to bring into the market those consumers who would ...
متن کاملPlanned Obsolescence and the Provision of Unobserbable Quality
This paper develops the idea that obsolescence acts as an incentive device to provide quality for experience goods. The argument is that obsolescence affects the frequency at which consumers repurchase products and may punish producers for a lack of quality. A higher rate of obsolescence enables a firm to convince its consumers that it provides high quality. We identify a trade–off between qual...
متن کاملStrategic Delegation By Unobservable Incentive Contracts
January 2002 (First version: November 1998) Many strategic interactions in the real world take place among delegates empowered to act on behalf of others. Although there may be a multitude of reasons why delegation arises in reality, one intriguing possibility is that it yields a strategic advantage to the delegating party. In the case where only one party has the option to delegate, we analyze...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: The Economic Journal
سال: 2009
ISSN: 0013-0133,1468-0297
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0297.2009.02290.x