Phenomenal Holism and Cognitive Phenomenology

Phenomenology and Cognitive Linguistics

The purpose of this chapter is to describe some similarities, as well as differences, between theoretical proposals emanating from the tradition of phenomenology and the currently popular approach to language and cognition known as cognitive linguistics (hence CL). This is a rather demanding and potentially controversial topic. For one thing, neither CL nor phenomenology constitute monolithic t...

Phenomenal transparency and cognitive self-reference1

A representationalist analysis of strong first-person phenomena is developed (Baker 1998), and it is argued that conscious, cognitive self-reference can be naturalized under this representationalist analysis. According to this view, the phenomenal first-person perspective is a condition of possibility for the emergence of a cognitive first-person perspective. Cognitive self-reference always is ...

Cognitive Phenomenology: An Introduction

Epistemological holism without linguistic holism

Epistemological holism is usually associated with linguistic holism, and sometimes the latter is inferred from the former. In this chapter I shall show how the view that the sense of a sentence be its immediate argumental role, though it conforms to the requirement of compositionality and hence involves a denial of linguistic holism, is perfectly compatible with epistemological holism. Thus, by...

The Case Against Cognitive Phenomenology

The goal of this chapter is to mount a critique of the claim that cognitive content (that is, the kind of content possessed by our concepts and thoughts) makes a constitutive contribution to the phenomenal properties of our mental lives. We therefore defend the view that phenomenal consciousness is exclusively experiential (or nonconceptual) in character. The main focus of the chapter is on the...