Persistent Distortionary Policies with Asymmetric Information
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Persistent Distortionary Policies with Asymmetric Information
Why do distortionary policies persist when Pareto improvements are seemingly available? According to a standard textbook argument, an efficient outcome can be obtained by eliminating the distortions, compensating the losers with a lump-sum transfer, and redistributing the gains that are left over. This paper shows that this argument hinges on the assumption of complete information about the los...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: American Economic Review
سال: 2006
ISSN: 0002-8282
DOI: 10.1257/000282806776157605