Performance Information, Production Uncertainty, and Subjective Entitlements in Bargaining
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Performance Information, Production Uncertainty, and Subjective Entitlements in Bargaining
We experimentally explore the effects and interactions of three variables considered important when bargaining over a jointly produced surplus: performance information, production uncertainties when translating performance into output, and subjective entitlements derived from the production process. We find that without performance information subjective entitlements are mostly mutually consist...
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Information, Uncertainty, and Subjective Entitlements in Bargaining More often than not production processes are the joint endeavor of people having different abilities and productivities. Such production processes and the associated surplus production are often not fully transparent in the sense that the relative contributions of involved agents are blurred; either by lack of information about...
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We study a one-sided offers bargaining game in which the buyer has private information about the value of the object and the seller has private information about his beliefs about the buyer. We show that this uncertainty about uncertainties dramatically changes the set of possible outcomes when compared to two-sided private information. In particular, higher order beliefs can lead to a delay in...
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This paper provides a novel understanding of delays in reaching agreements based on the idea of strategic uncertainty—i.e., the idea that a Bargainer may face uncertainty about her opponent’s play, even if there is no uncertainty about the structure of the game. It considers a particular form of strategic uncertainty, called on path strategic certainty. On path strategic certainty is the assump...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Management Science
سال: 2015
ISSN: 0025-1909,1526-5501
DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2014.2012