Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model

Nash equilibrium in a spatial model of coalition bargaining

In the model presented here, n parties choose policy positions in a space Z of dimension at least two. Each party is represented by a ‘‘principal’’ whose true policy preferences on Z are unknown to other principals. In the first version of the model the party declarations determine the lottery outcome of coalition negotiation. The coalition risk functions are common knowledge to the parties. We...

Equilibrium Partner Switching in a Bargaining Model with Asymmetric Information

We study a model in which the seller of an indivisible object faces two potential buyers and makes an offer to either of them in each period. We find that the seller’s ability to extract surplus from them depends crucially on the value of the cost of switching from one buyer to the next. If the seller is pessimistic about the buyers’ valuations and there is a switching cost, however small, then...

Perfect Equilibria of a Model of N-person Noncooperative Bargaining

Bargaining Equilibrium in a Non-Stationary Environment

In this paper we study an alternating-offers bargaining model in which the set of possible utility pairs evolves through time in a non-stationary, but smooth manner. In general there exists a multiplicity of subgame perfect equilibria. However, we show that in the limit as the time interval between two consecutive offers becomes arbitrarily small, there exists a unique subgame perfect equilibri...

Competitive bargaining equilibrium

We propose a simple bargaining procedure, the equilibrium of which converges to the Walrasian allocation as the agents become increasingly patient. We thus establish that the competitive outcome obtains even if agents have market power and are not price-takers. Moreover, where in other bargaining protocols the final outcome depends on bargaining power or relative impatience, the outcome here is...