Perfect equilibria in games of incomplete information
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
A systematic procedure for nding Perfect Bayesian Equilibria in Incomplete Information Games
This paper provides a non-technical introduction to a procedure to nd Perfect Bayesian equilibria (PBEs) in incomplete information games. Despite the rapidly expanding literature on industrial organization that uses PBE as its main solution concept, most undergraduate and graduate textbooks still present a relatively theoretical introduction to PBEs. This paper o¤ers a systematic ve-step proc...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Economic Theory
سال: 2020
ISSN: 0938-2259,1432-0479
DOI: 10.1007/s00199-020-01311-y