Payout Policy, Agency Conflict and Corporate Governance in Nigeria
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Payout policy, agency conflicts, and corporate governance
We examine the effect of corporate governance on the use of dividends and repurchases, composition of payout, and inclusion of a pre-commitment feature in the payout policy. We find that dividend payout is decreasing in governance quality. Corporate governance has a mixed effect on repurchases: good external governance prompts managers to repurchase more and to use repurchases as the only form ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Review of Public Administration and Management
سال: 2013
ISSN: 2315-7844
DOI: 10.4172/2315-7844.1000120