Payoff implications of incentive contracting

نویسندگان

چکیده

In the context of a canonical agency model, we study payoff implications introducing optimally structured incentives. We do so from perspective an analyst who does not know agent's preferences for responding to incentives, but that principal knows them. provide, in particular, tight bounds on principal's expected benefit optimal incentive contracting across feasible values rents. thus show how economically relevant predictions can be made robustly given ignorance key primitive.

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ژورنال

عنوان ژورنال: Theoretical Economics

سال: 2021

ISSN: ['1555-7561', '1933-6837']

DOI: https://doi.org/10.3982/te4293