PAYING MORE TO HIRE THE BEST? FOREIGN FIRMS, WAGES, AND WORKER MOBILITY
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Paying More to Hire the Best? Foreign Firms, Wages and Worker Mobility
Paying More to Hire the Best? Foreign Firms, Wages and Worker Mobility In the context of the debate on the labour-market consequences of globalisation, we examine worker mobility in order to identify the wage differences between foreign and domestic firms. Using matched employer-employee panel data for Portugal, we consider virtually all spells of interfirm mobility over a period of ten years. ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Economic Inquiry
سال: 2011
ISSN: 0095-2583
DOI: 10.1111/j.1465-7295.2010.00301.x