Partnerships of Bidders with Constant Relative Risk Aversions
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Constant-Competitive Prior-Free Auction with Ordered Bidders
A central problem in Microeconomics is to design auctions with good revenue properties. In this setting, the bidders’ valuations for the items are private knowledge, but they are drawn from publicly known prior distributions. The goal is to find a truthful auction (no bidder can gain in utility by misreporting her valuation) that maximizes the expected revenue. Naturally, the optimal-auction is...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Mathematical Problems in Engineering
سال: 2020
ISSN: 1024-123X,1563-5147
DOI: 10.1155/2020/3925835