Partial ex-post verifiability and unique implementation of social choice functions
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Ex post implementation
We analyze the problem of fully implementing a social choice set in ex post equilibrium. We identify an ex post monotonicity condition that is necessary and in economic environments su¢ cient for full implementation in ex post equilibrium. We also identify an ex post monotonicity no veto condition that is su¢ cient. Ex post monotonicity is satis ed in all single crossing environments with stric...
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The sensitivity of Bayesian implementation to agentsbeliefs about others suggests the use of more robust notions of implementation such as ex-post implementation, which requires that each agents strategy be optimal for every possible realization of the types of other agents. We show that the only deterministic social choice functions that are ex-post implementable in generic mechanism design ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Social Choice and Welfare
سال: 2020
ISSN: 0176-1714,1432-217X
DOI: 10.1007/s00355-020-01292-w