Pareto optimality and strategy-proofness in group argument evaluation
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Pareto Optimality and Strategy Proofness in Group Argument Evaluation
An inconsistent knowledge base can be abstracted as a set of arguments and a defeat relation among them. There can be more than one consistent way to evaluate such an argumentation graph. Collective argument evaluation is the problem of aggregating the opinions of multiple agents on how a given set of arguments should be evaluated. It is crucial not only to ensure that the outcome is logically ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Logic and Computation
سال: 2017
ISSN: 0955-792X,1465-363X
DOI: 10.1093/logcom/exx017