Optimal strategies of a dual-channel green supply chain with recycling under retailer promotional effort

نویسندگان

چکیده

Due to the hugely populated world, recycling of used products has become most significant perspective in e-commerce. The scientists have been exploring how increases degree recyclability and green innovation level. This paper considers a supply chain with manufacturer, retailer, supplier, collector. manufacturer can increase or decrease level by changing quality raw materials. He sells them through his direct channel as well retailer’s traditional channel. retailer enforces strategy promotional effort for enlarging market demand. After formulating problem, strategies collector-led, supplier-led, collector–supplier Nash, collector–supplier–retailer Nash game are studied under Stackelberg games along centralized policy. parameters’ sensitivity analyzed profits decision variables then draw managerial insights. model declares optimal each player chain. It is achieved that higher always all profit. pricing decisions be lowest Collector–Supplier game.

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ژورنال

عنوان ژورنال: Rairo-operations Research

سال: 2021

ISSN: ['1290-3868', '0399-0559']

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1051/ro/2021016