منابع مشابه
optimal design of securitization in a principal-agent relationship based on bayesian inference for moral hazard
in the securitization process, by selling the mortgage loans to risk-lover investors, originator can allocate the mortgage loans risk to them. in this case, originator may not have an incentive to screen out borrowers, resulting in the moral hazard problem. this paper, within a principal-agent framework, analyzes this agency problem. investor, to reduce asymmetric information, uses compensation...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Financial Economics
سال: 2012
ISSN: 0304-405X
DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.12.007