Optimal Regulation of Financial Intermediaries
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Risk, Leverage, and Regulation of Financial Intermediaries
This paper presents a model on the leverage of nancial intermediaries, where debt are held by risk averse agents and equity by the risk neutral. The paper shows that in an unregulated competitive market, nancial intermediaries choose to be leveraged over the social best level. This is because the leverage of one intermediary imposes a negative externality upon others by reducing their pro t m...
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A complex financial system comprises both financial markets and financial intermediaries. We distinguish financial intermediaries according to whether they issue complete contingent contracts or incomplete contracts. Intermediaries such as banks that issue incomplete contracts, e.g., demand deposits, are subject to runs, but this does not imply a market failure. A sophisticated financial system...
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Over the last fifteen years, emerging economies have experienced abrupt changes in bond spreads and large movements in capital flows. We propose a simple general equilibrium model where international investors hire fund managers to invest their capital either in the bonds of an emerging economy or in a riskless asset. We model the emerging economy as a small-open economy subject to an aggregate...
متن کاملDynamic Monitoring of Financial Intermediaries with Subordinated Debt Structured
Structured Abstract Purpose Subordinated debt regulatory proposals assume that transactions in the secondary market of subordinated debt can attenuate moral hazard on the part of management if secondary market prices are informative signals of the risk of the institution. Owing to the proprietary nature of dealer prices and the liquidity of secondary transactions, the practical value of informa...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: American Economic Review
سال: 2019
ISSN: 0002-8282
DOI: 10.1257/aer.20161488