Optimal Public Expenditure with Inefficient Unemployment
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Optimal Public Expenditure with Inefficient Unemployment
This paper proposes a theory of optimal public expenditure when unemployment is inefficient. The theory is based on a matching model. Optimal public expenditure deviates from the Samuelson rule to reduce the unemployment gap (the gap between the current and efficient rates of unemployment). Such optimal “stimulus spending” is described by a formula expressed with estimable sufficient statistics...
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BACKGROUND The global economic downturn has been associated with increased unemployment and reduced public-sector expenditure on health care (PSEH). We determined the association between unemployment, PSEH and HIV mortality. METHODS Data were obtained from the World Bank and the World Health Organisation (1981-2009). Multivariate regression analysis was implemented, controlling for country-sp...
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In the framework of a search and matching model, when search effort enters the labor market matching function, search effort by one worker generates a negative externality on other workers searching for jobs. The solution to the social planner’s problem may not be decentralized in a competitive market. Calibration shows that the current US unemployment insurance (UI) system generates an 8.07% w...
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The framework of a general equilibrium heterogeneous agent model is used to study the optimal design of an unemployment insurance (UI) scheme and preferences for unemployment policy reforms. In a first step, the optimal defined benefit and defined replacement ratio UI systems are obtained in simulations. Then, the question whether switching to such an optimal system from the status quo would be...
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We investigate the design of an optimal Unemployment Insurance program using an equilibrium search and matching model calibrated using data from the reemployment bonus experiments and secondary sources. We examine (a) the optimal potential duration of UI benefits, (b) the optimal UI replacement rate when the potential duration of benefits is optimal, and (c) the optimal UI replacement rate when...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: The Review of Economic Studies
سال: 2018
ISSN: 0034-6527,1467-937X
DOI: 10.1093/restud/rdy030