Optimal Factor Taxation under Wage Bargaining: A Dynamic Perspective

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ژورنال

عنوان ژورنال: German Economic Review

سال: 2008

ISSN: 1468-0475,1465-6485

DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0475.2008.00428.x