منابع مشابه
Optimal auctions with financially constrained buyers
• 1 item and N bidders • private valuations: vi ∈ {ǫ, 2ǫ, . . . ,mǫ} • private budgets: bi st b1 < b2 < · · · < bk • private types: t = (v, b) • type distribution: t ∼ π density function: fb(v) distribution function: Fb(v) • monotone hazard rate: (v, b) ≥ (v, b) → 1−Fb(v) fb(v) ≥ 1−Fb′ (v ) f b′ (v ′) • direct mechanism: M = (a, p) allocation probability a(t) (expected) payment p(t) Assumptions...
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Westudy independent private-value all-pay auctionswith risk-averse players. We show that: (1) Players with low values bid lower and players with high values bid higher than they would bid in the risk neutral case. (2) Players with low values bid lower and players with high values bid higher than they would bid in a first-price auction. (3) Players’ expected utilities in an all-pay auction are l...
متن کاملLarge auctions with risk-averse bidders
We study private-value auctions with n risk-averse bidders, where n is large. We first use asymptotic analysis techniques to calculate explicit approximations of the equilibriumbids and of the seller’s revenue in any k-price auction (k = 1, 2, . . .). These explicit approximations show that in all large k-price auctions the effect of risk-aversion is O(1/n2) small. Hence, all large k-price auct...
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1 We are grateful to Steve Matthews for suggesting the approach taken in this study, and to Eric Maskin for his encouraging comment. Abstract This paper concerns the e¢ cient sale of an indivisible risky asset and the e¤ects of changing risk in a setting where buyers exhibit heterogeneous risk preferences. The model allows asymmetric and interdependent values and types. Under certain conditions...
متن کاملOptimal Auctions with Financially Constrained with Buyers pdfkeywords
We consider an environment where ex-ante symmetric potential buyers of an indivisible good have liquidity constraints, i.e. they cannot pay more than their ‘budget’ regardless of their valuation. A buyer’s valuation for the good as well as her budget are her private information. We derive the symmetric constrained-efficient and revenue maximizing auctions for this setting. We show how to implem...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Econometrica
سال: 1984
ISSN: 0012-9682
DOI: 10.2307/1913516