منابع مشابه
On the Three-Person Game Baccara Banque
Baccara banque is a three-person zero-sum game parameterized by θ ∈ (0, 1). A study of the game by Downton and Lockwood claimed that the Nash equilibrium is of only academic interest. Their preferred alternative is what we call the independent cooperative equilibrium. But this solution exists only for certain θ. A third solution, which we call the correlated cooperative equilibrium, always exis...
متن کاملThe Curvilinear Search Algorithm for Solving Three-Person Game
We formulate the problem of finding a Nash equilibrium point for the non-zero sum three-person game as a nonconvex optimization problem by generalizing Mills’s theorem [10]. For solving the problem, we propose the curvilinear algorithm which allows us to find global solutions. The proposed algorithm was tested numerically on some examples as well as on 3 competitive companies which share the br...
متن کاملAgency matters! Social preferences in the three-person ultimatum game
In the present study EEG was recorded simultaneously while two participants were playing the three-person ultimatum game (UG). Both participants received different offers from changing proposers about how to split up a certain amount of money between the three players. One of the participants had no say, whereas the other, the responder, was able to harm the payoff of all other players. The aim...
متن کاملA Game-Theoretic Analysis of Baccara Chemin de Fer
Assuming that cards are dealt with replacement from a single deck and that each of Player and Banker sees the total of his own two-card hand but not its composition, baccara is a 2 × 2 matrix game, which was solved by Kemeny and Snell in 1957. Assuming that cards are dealt without replacement from a d-deck shoe and that Banker sees the composition of his own two-card hand while Player sees only...
متن کاملTotal tightness implies Nash-solvability for three-person game forms
It is long known [13] that every totally tight 2-person game form is Nash-solvable, that is, it has a Nash-equilibrium for any set of player preferences. Furthermore, it is also known [2] that every totally tight 2-person game form is acyclic and dominance solvable. In this short paper we generalize the first result to 3-person game forms, leaving the general n-person case open. On the other ha...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Games
سال: 2015
ISSN: 2073-4336
DOI: 10.3390/g6020057